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The operational ambiguity around Shijian-28 is intriguing in its own right. China's willingness to fly technology validation missions without publicizing specifics suggests confidence in using above-LEO environments as a proving ground for systems that may be sensitive or still experimental. What strikes me is the shortened preparation cycle you mentioned, down from 35 to 19 days. That sort of infrastructure maturation at Wenchang is not trivial; it implies they're moving toward a cadence-focused operational model rather than treating each mission as a bespoke event. The Long March 7A is quietly becoming their workhorse for beyond-LEO, which matters if China is serious about sustained lunar logistics or medium-orbit constellations. The lack of mission detail might also reflect a broader trend where certain technologies (propulsion, in-space maneuvering, maybe even sensor platforms) don't require public justification the way earlier missions did. That shift from transparency to operational routine says something about how China views space infrastructure now, less as prestige and more as utility.

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